

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----095158 120930Z /20

O 120725Z APR 78

FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8288  
INFO AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 1597

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PDEV, RH, TZ, US, UK

SUBJECT: RHODESIA: NYERERE, MALTA II, AND THE SALISBURY  
PARTIES

1. SUMMARY: WITH THE NEXT ROUND OF RHOHASIA TALKS JUST AHEAD, WE  
THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO SET DOWN OUR ESTIMATE OF PRESIDENT  
NYERERE'S CURRENT APPROACH TO A SETTLEMENT: IN SUM, HE WILL BE  
HELPFUL AND COOPERATIVE AT MALTA II, BUT WE THINK HE WILL TAKE A  
HARD LINE APPROACH TO THE DISCUSSIONS WITH SALISBURY PARTIES.  
END SUMMARY.

2. NYERERE WILL NOT BE AT THE TABLE FOR MALTA II AND HE WILL NOT  
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BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED AT ALL IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SALISBURY  
PARTIES. HOWEVER, HIS INFLUENCE WILL PROBABLY BE FELT MORE THAN  
THAT OF ANY OTHER AFRICAN LEADER. THREE INSTANTS STAND OUT IN  
HIS APPROACH TO RHODESIA. HE HAS GIVEN NO SIGN OF WAVERING FROM  
THEM AND THEY ARE WORTH BEARING IN MIND:

A. NYERERE WOULD PREFER AN EQUITABLE PEACEFUL SOLUTION,  
REGARDLESS OF WHAT KIND OF A GOVERNMENT EMERGES IN AN INDEPENDENT

ZIMBABWE. ONLY IF EVERY EFFORT AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT FAILS WILL HE HAVE THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION HE FEELS ESSENTIAL FOR STRUGGLE TO THE END.

B. NYERERE TRUSTS PRESIDENT CARTER TO DO THE RIGHT THING. HE FEELS THAT HE AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE AN AGREEMENT ON THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF A RHODESIA SETTLEMENT. THIS INCLUDES PRESIDENT CARTER'S UNDERTAKING TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO REMOVE SMITH FROM POWER AT THE RIGHT TIME.

C. NYERERE ABSOLUTELY DISTRUSTS SMITH AND HIS POWER STRUCTURE. NOTHING WHICH INVOLVES THEM IN RHODESIA'S FUTURE IS ACCEPTABLE TO HIM.

3. NYERERE HAS A CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT IN FINDING A RHODESIAN SOLUTION. AS CHAIRMAN OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS, HE TOOK A LEADING ROLE IN ENCOURAGING AGREEMENT IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS AS AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE FINDS THE AAP ATTRACTIVE BECAUSE IT ENGAGES THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS, THE BRITISH BEING NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THEIR LEGAL POSITION AND THE AMERICANS BECAUSE OF THEIR POWER. NYERERE IS PREPARED TO BE REASONABLY FLEXIBLE ON THE AAP ITSELF AS LONG AS THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE PLAN. HE BELIEVES THEIR COMMITMENT, TOGETHER WITH PF MILITARY ACTIVITY, OFFERS THE BEST POSSIBILITY TO GENERATE THE PRESSURE NECESSARY TO PUSH SMITH OUT -- AND THAT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO GET A VIABLE SETTLEMENT. IN OPERATIONAL TERMS, A FAILED SESSION WITH THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SALISBURY PARTIES WHICH LEFT US-UK-PF-FL UNITY INTACT WOULD BE TO NYERERE A BETTER RESULT THAN A SUCCESSFUL ALL PARTIES ARRANGEMENT WHICH MADE MAJOR CONCESSIONS TO SMITH TO GET A SETTLEMENT.

4. NYERERE'S IMMEDIATE TASK IS TO OBTAIN PATRIOTIC FRONT AGREEMENT ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS. HE FEARS THAT IF THIS CANNOT BE

ACHIEVED, THE CHANCES OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS BACKING AWAY FROM THE AAP ARE CONSIDERABLE. MALTA II IS IN LARGE PART HIS INITIATIVE AND HE NOW FINDS HIMSELF TAKING A MORE CENTRAL ROLE ON RHODESIA THAN HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED. HE EXERTED GREAT PRESSURE ON THE PF TO ACCEPT THE AAP AT THE MARCH DAR ES SALAAM FRONT LINE SUMMIT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE IN FACT ACHIEVED SOMETHING LESS THAN HE HAS GIVEN US TO UNDERSTAND. TO FINISH THE JOB, HE DEEMS IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE MALTA II MEETING BE IN TANZANIA WHERE HE COULD BE ON HAND; HENCE HIS INSISTENCE ON THE DAR ES SALAAM VENUE.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----094859 120932Z /13

O 120725Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8289  
INFO AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 1597

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

5. ALL OF THIS CAN BE USEFUL TO US AT MALTA II. NYERERE WILL BE FLEXIBLE AND COOPERATIVE IN SEEKING PF AGREEMENT TO THE AAP. HE HAS KEPT HIS FRONT LINE COLLEAGUES UNITED THUS FAR AND HE CAN INFLUENCE THEM MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE. AND THE FL TOGETHER ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO REALLY LEAN ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AS FAR AS ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SALISBURY PARTIES ARE CONCERNED, THE DYNAMICS WILL BE DIFFERENT. NYERERE WILL HOPE TO HAVE HIS US-UK-PF-FL AGREEMENT. HE WILL WANT TO USE IT TO FORCE THE SALISBURY GROUP TO ACCEPT THE AAP ARRANGEMENT, AND AT MINIMUM TO DENY US/UK ACCEPTANCE OF THE INTERNAL PLAN. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE IS FAR LESS LIKELY TO URGE MODERATION ON THE PF AND HE WILL NOT EVEN BE NEARBY TO APPLY REASON.

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6. YOU WILL WANT TO SPEND TIME WITH NYERERE APART FROM THE CONFERENCE -- BOTH SHOULD MALTA II BEGIN TO RUN INTO TROUBLE AND TO URGE HIM TO CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE ON SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SALISBURY PARTIES. HIS INTENSE INTEREST AND DEEP

INVOLVEMENT IN THE RHODESIA PROBLEM HAVE GENERATED IN HIM AN INTELLECTUAL EXCITEMENT ON THE SUBJECT WHICH MAKES HIM GENERALLY EASY AND SATISFYING TO DEAL WITH. EMOTION APPEARS NOW AND AGAIN BUT HE CAN ALWAYS BE CAUGHT BY A RATIONAL IDEA. HE RECOGNIZES THE PRIMACY OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT OVER TECHNICAL OR LEGAL NICETY. HE RESISTS AND RESENTS ANYTHING T(AT HE MIGHT INTERPRET AS "SALAMI-SLICING" OR RETREAT FROM AGREED PRINCIPLES. HE RESPONDS WELL TO EVIDENCE OF HONESTY AND COMMITMENT -- WHICH HE SEES AS THE MOST APPEALING CHARACTERISTIC OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. AT THE SAME TIME, HE IS USUALLY WILLING TO CONSIDER FACE-SAVING DEVICES TO MAKE HARD DECISIONS MORE PALATABLE FOR HIS OPPONENTS -- EVEN SMITH, VORSTER, AND THEIR ASSOCIATES. FINALLY, NYERERE IS AS GOOD A LISTNER AS HE IS A TALKER. SPEAKING, HE GRINS AND SPARKLES. LISTENING, HE SCOWLS. IT IS WELL TO REMEMBER THAT THE SCOWL IS A HABITUAL ONE OF CONCENTRATION -- NOT NECESSARILY OF DISAPPROVAL.

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